Good morning. This meeting of the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee will come to order.

This being the first hearing of this new term, it could not be a

more timely hearing. Recent developments in North Korea, most

notably, the February 12, 2013, nuclear test and the December 12,

2012, missile tests, highlight the growing threat that North Korea

poses to the United States, our allies and friends in the region, and

the increasing dangers of severe instability on the Korean Peninsula.

Given this growing set of circumstances, I believe the committee

needs to take a close look at current United States policy

toward North Korea, evaluate its effectiveness, and identify any

midcourse corrections or new measures that are required to get our

North Korea policy right.

I understand that as we convene this hearing, this morning, that

in New York the United Nations Security Council is sitting down

to consider a resolution that imposes additional sanctions on North

Korea. This new Security Council resolution, based on a United

States-China draft, includes tough new sanctions intended to impede

North Korea’s ability to develop further its illicit nuclear and

ballistic missile programs. These sanctions include targeting the

illicit activities of North Korean diplomatic personnel, North

Korean banking relationships, illicit transfers of bulk cash, and

new travel restrictions.

I think that these actions are a step in the right direction and

very much in keeping with the sort of approach that the ranking

member, Senator Corker, and I called for in the North Korea Nonproliferation

and Accountability Act of 2013, which the Senate

passed on February 25.

And I congratulate the administration on moving things forward

so effectively at the United Nations.

But I also believe that we need to do more to better determine

how the United States can combine effective sanctions and military

countermeasures with strong and realistic diplomacy aimed at

North Korea and at China—and with the clear goal of North

Korea’s abandonment of its nuclear programs.

North Korea yesterday made what I consider to be, of course, an

absurd threat of a ‘‘preemptive nuclear attack’’ to destroy the

strongholds of the ‘‘aggressors’’ in response to the action that the

United States, China, and others are seeking at the United

Nations.

There should be no doubt about our determination, willingness,

and capability to neutralize and counter any threat that North

Korea may present. I do not think that the regime in Pyongyang

wants to commit suicide but, as they must surely know, that would

be the result of any attack on the United States.

But even as we think about potential measures and actions necessary

to safeguard the United States and our allies, there should

also be no doubt about our determination to work with the international

community through peaceful diplomatic means to achieve

a denuclearized Korean Peninsula.

Today it is estimated that North Korea has accumulated between

20 and 40 kilograms of plutonium, enough perhaps for six to eight

nuclear weapons. It has now conducted three nuclear explosive

tests. It has developed a modern gas centrifuge uranium enrichment

program to go along with its plutonium stockpile, and it is

seeking to develop the capability to mate a nuclear warhead to an

intercontinental ballistic missile.

Taken together, these developments present a growing danger

that North Korea may well become a small nuclear power, a scenario

which, while bad enough on its own, could well have additional

dangerous effects if it leads other nations in the region to

reconsider their own commitments to nonproliferation.

Moreover, there is also the continuing danger of further conventional

military provocation from North Korea that results in a serious

military clash between North and South and the potential for

unintended escalation that could draw in the United States and

China and result in a dangerous confrontation on the peninsula.

And beyond these security concerns, there are also the ongoing

questions about human rights and the lot of the North Korean people.

Security concerns may be our most important priority on the

peninsula, but they are not our only priority.

It has now been a little over a year since Kim Jong-un took

power amid speculation that this transition could lead to a period

of instability inside the North, perhaps even leading to collapse.

Yet, that instability does not appear to have materialized.

Although, of course, we can never be sure about what the future

is in North Korea, by all appearances Kim has asserted control

over the military and strengthened party institutions, and contrary

to some media hype focus on his education in Switzerland, he has

not proved to be a reformer. It is unclear whether he has any objectives

other than maintaining tight control of his political and economic

system.

Above all else, North Korea clearly represents a real and growing

threat to national security interests and therefore deserves our

close attention. In time, if its present course remains unaltered,

North Korea could pose a direct threat to the United States.

Today North Korea certainly poses a growing threat to our allies

and to American forces in the region. It also threatens to undermine

the international nonproliferation regime, particularly as its

arsenal grows, by spreading its threat to other countries through

a transfer of nuclear technology and materials. We know, for example,

that North Korea has made efforts to proliferate nuclear technology

in the past, building a plutonium separation plant in Syria

which Israel destroyed by bombing it before its completion, and we

know that there is a long history of North Korean-Iranian military

cooperation.

I hope that this hearing, as well as a continuing dialogue with

the administration on this issue, will help us explore several key

questions that are critical to informing our future policy toward

North Korea. Does North Korea pursue a nuclear weapons program

as a deterrent for defensive purposes, or does it pursue such a program

as part of a policy intended to reunify the peninsula by force?

Could the current regime ever conceive of parting with its nuclear

capability, or does it view these weapons as essential tools as deterrence

against others to continue its hold on power? Getting these

answers right will be critical to determining if there is hope for

diplomacy or if a different approach is necessary.

It is also important to note the coming power of a new South

Korean administration led by President Park at this difficult time.

We offer her our congratulations on her inauguration last week.

There is no basis for successfully dealing with the North absent a

solid foundation for policy rooted in the United States-Republic of

Korea alliance. With President Park’s inauguration, we have an

opportunity to consult and work closely with a close ally to chart

our future course in dealing with North Korea.

And finally, we need to consider how recent transitions in other

countries in the region, including our close ally, Japan, as well as

China, may present new opportunities in building a more effective

approach to dealing with Pyongyang.

Whatever one’s views on the various policy efforts of the past two

decades, and what has worked and what has not worked and why,

there can be little question that these efforts have failed to end

North Korea’s nuclear or missile programs, failed to reduce the

threat posed to our allies, and failed to lead to greater security in

the region. But I am hopeful that today’s hearing and the conversation

we start today may help us get to a place where 20 years from

now we can look back at successfully having ended North Korea’s

nuclear and missile programs, and having built greater stability

and security on the peninsula and throughout the Asia-Pacific

region.

Let me call upon the distinguished ranking member, Senator

Corker, for his comments.

Thank you, Senator Corker.

Today’s two panels pull together some of the top decisionmakers

on North Korean policy from the current and several previous

administrations. They represent decades of experience, following

North Korea from both in and outside the Government, and can

bear witness to years of both progress and setbacks in our policy.

And I can think of no better group to help analyze what has

worked and what has not, and I fully expect they may hold, in

some cases, quite different views in this regard. That is only natural

considering the critical importance and extraordinary complexity

of addressing North Korea, and I would view simple

answers with considerable skepticism. So we are going to look forward

to this discussion.

We start off with the distinguished Ambassador Glyn Davies. He

has served as the Special Representative of the Secretary of State

for North Korea Policy since January 2012. He oversees U.S.

involvement in the six-party talks process, as well as aspects of our

security, political, economic, human rights, and humanitarian

assistance policy regarding North Korea. He is a career member of

the Senior Foreign Service, served previously as the Permanent

Representative of the United States to the International Atomic

Energy Agency and the U.N. office in Vienna, as well as the

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of

East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Executive Secretary of the

National Security Council staff. So an extraordinary wealth of

knowledge. We welcome you to the committee and look forward to

your testimony.

Thank you, Ambassador.

We will start a round and I will start.

Let me just take off of that almost closing comment that you

made, that real progress depends upon North Korea changing its

strategic calculus. The question is, What is it that we and our

allies can do to affect changing North Korea’s strategic calculus so

that it moves in a different direction? And in that context, isn’t

really the key here, despite everything else that we are in the

midst of pursuing, China and its potential influence with the North

Koreans? And if that is the case, how is it that we can get the

Chinese to be more robust in their efforts to get North Korea to

change its strategic calculus?

Let me pursue that with you. For China, it

seems to me—and correct me if I am wrong—there are two calculus

here. One is they can do what they are doing with us at the United

Nations today, which is pursue a set of new sanctions, and that

will rattle the North Koreans to some extent. Or they can choose

to go ahead and significantly cut back on that which is essential

to North Korea’s existence which is its assistance directly in fuel,

as well as other sources. That would be far more significant.

From your perspective, what is the Chinese calculus then? Now

they are joining us—we welcome that—at the Security Council. But

they have a much bigger, more significant ability by virtue of the

incredible assistance it gives North Korea.

Senator Corker.

Senator Udall.

Thank you.

Senator Rubio.

Senator Cardin.

Senator Johnson.

Senator Murphy.

Senator Kaine.

Senator Flake.

Senator Corker has one additional question.

Well, let me just make an observation. First of

all, we are very aspirational here. [Laughter.]

But I think in part just an observation on Senator

Corker’s question which is that, obviously, one of the reasons

we have so vigorously pursued a sanctions regime on Iran is because

Iran is not where North Korea is in terms of its nuclear program

and we do not desire it to get to that point as North Korea

has. So whether or not there was a different point in time in which

maybe a previous administration should have adopted a very similar

position as we have now with Iran, we are past that moment.

And our question is how do we deal with the realities of the

moment and try to change the dynamics, the strategic calculus

both inside of North Korea and, I hope, the strategic calculus of

China in this context, which plays a key role toward, hopefully, getting

us to the point that we want to be.

With the thanks of the committee and for your staying power, we

appreciate very much your appearing here, and we look forward to

continuing dialogue with you and the administration on this critical

issue.

As we excuse Ambassador Davies, let me call up our next panel.

Ambassador Stephen Bosworth who served for over a decade as

dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University,

and from March 2009 to October 2011, served as the U.S. Special

Representative for North Korea Policy. From 1997 to 2001,

Ambassador Bosworth was the U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of

Korea. From 1995 to 1997, he was the Executive Director of the

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, an intergovernmental

organization established by the United States, the

Republic of Korea, and Japan. And Ambassador Bosworth has a

distinguished career in the U.S. Foreign Service for nearly three

decades.

Please, gentlemen come on up and sit right at the table.

Joseph DeTrani is the president of the Intelligence and National

Security Alliance. He previously worked as the Senior Advisor in

the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Director of

ODNI’s National Counterproliferation Center, and as the ODNI’s

North Korean Mission Manager. Prior to his work at ODNI,

Ambassador DeTrani served at the Department of State as both a

Special Envoy for Negotiations with North Korea and as the U.S.

Representative to the Korea Energy Development Corporation. He

has worked in numerous roles throughout the Central Intelligence

Agency and has extensive experience in that regard as well.

Finally, Robert Joseph is the senior scholar at the National Institute

for Public Policy. From 2005 to 2007, Ambassador Joseph was

the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International

Security, and from 2001 to 2004, he served in the National Security

Council as Special Assistant to the President and the Senior Director

for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation and Homeland

Defense. Ambassador Joseph also served in the Department of

Defense as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for

International Security Policy and Deputy Assistant Secretary of

Defense for Nuclear Forces and Arms Control.

So we have a very distinguished panel here.

I am going to ask each of you to summarize your statement in

around 5 minutes. Your full statements will be entered into the

record so we can have time for some dialogue here, as we move forward.

We want to pick upon your expertise to draw some of the

questions and answers to some of the issues that have already been

raised with our previous panelist, Ambassador Davies.

And so we will start in the order that I recognized you: Ambassador

Bosworth, Ambassador DeTrani, and Ambassador Joseph.

Thank you very much.

Ambassador DeTrani.

Thank you.

Ambassador Joseph.

Thank you very much. Thank you all for your

testimony.

Let us start and I would like to have an interplay between

Ambassador Bosworth and DeTrani on this. If the 2005 joint statement

was the best pathway toward achieving our goals—and,

Ambassador DeTrani, you suggested that that issue, the Patriot

Act sanctions of the bank and the $25 million that ultimately

flowed back to North Korea was a disruptive element in pursuing

the 2005 process. Clearly in any such process, there are going to

be bumps along the road. Does that not really call into question

how serious North Korea was even in this more expanded process

of 2005 to achieving its goals? I would like both of your observations

on that because it sounds to me that especially when the

money ultimately flowed back to North Korea, that the process

would have resumed again if there was a real desire to pursue it.

Evidently, while that may have been our message,

they did not accept that message as a means to move forward.

Ambassador Bosworth, if that is the case it is so

easily disrupted, how do we see that as the pathway forward?

Ambassador DeTrani, there are some press

reports that suggest you have been on two secret missions to North

Korea. And I am wondering if you could tell us what was the temperature

of the interlocutors that you met with.

So you have discussed those with the House and

Senate——

All right. So we will pursue it with the Intelligence

Committee.

Let me ask you with reference to your comment that the Chinese

were the ones who got the North Koreans to the table in 2005 as

a result of tweaking them with some of their assistance. What was

the calculus at that moment that made them do that, and how do

we get them to make that calculus now?

All right.

Senator Corker.

Thank you.

Senator Murphy.

Thank you.

Senator Shaheen.

Well, thank you all for your very insightful comments

and answers to questions on a very challenging but important

national security and national interests issue before the committee

and before our country.

So with the thanks of the committee, the committee’s record will

remain open until the close of business tomorrow.

And with that, the hearing is adjourned.